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Abstract:  
Purpose – Utilising a finer-grained approach, this paper examines the ‘quality’ of narrative risk 
management disclosures (RMD) from a ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ (width and depth) perspective. 
Evidence is then provided on the relationships between RMD quality and the corporate determinants 
driving that quality. 
Design/methodology/approach – Within a multidimensional quality disclosure framework, annual 
report narrative RMD from the top 100 Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed companies 
precisely ‘matched’ for the 2010 and 2012 years were examined using semantic content analysis. The 
relationship between the dimensions and sub-dimensions of RMD ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’, and 
various corporate characteristics were explored using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis. 
Findings – The results indicate that RMD are considerably lacking in quality, from the ‘quantity’, 
‘width’ and particularly the ‘depth’ dimension and sub-dimensions for both years. Many companies 
provide ‘boiler plate’ RMD over consecutive years and many do not comply with the intent of the 
ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (CGPR) under the ‘if not, why not’ 
regime (ASX CGC 2010). Company size and cross listing were found to be the primary determinants 
of higher quality RMD and to a lesser extent firm risk. Some evidence was found that ‘quality’ RMD 
were less likely where companies are more highly leveraged and when their shareholders are more 
concentrated.  
Research limitations/implications – Although two coders independently coded the RMD and 
specific decision rules were followed, the subjectivity inherent in conducting semantic content 
analysis into the dimensions and sub-dimensions of the framework cannot be completely eliminated. 
However, by adopting a finer-grained approach this study contributes to the global literature on the 
quality of RMD.  Previous studies are extended by analysing and testing the individual dimensions 
and sub-dimensions of ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ which provides new empirical evidence and a more 
comprehensive portrayal of RMD quality and a greater understanding why some companies are more 
likely to disclose higher quality RMD than others. 
Practical implications –These results provide useful and predominantly new empirical evidence on 
the quality of RMD for practitioners, regulators and researchers. As many companies are not 
complying with the ‘intent’ of the ‘if not, why not’ approach, these results support the argument for 
mandated narrative RMD regulations at an international level. 
Originality/value – The multidimensional framework of RMD ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ provides a 
bases for examining not only how much is disclosed, but what is disclosed and how. In adopting a 
finer-grained approach, this study analyses and tests the individual dimensions and sub-dimensions of 
the framework.  This provides a deeper understanding of the overall quality of RMD and the 
determinants driving RMD quality for the sample companies. 
Keywords Risk management disclosures, Quality, Quantity, Richness, Width, Depth, Determinants. 
Paper type Research paper 
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Introduction 
High quality narrative RMD can assist investors, shareholders and analysts in making 
superior investment decisions (Lajili and Zéghal, 2005; Miihkinen, 2012), by enabling 
accuracy in determining the risk profile of companies (Linsley et al., 2008) and in assessing 
the potential impact of risks on a firms’ value and growth (Clarkson et al., 1999; Lajili and 
Zéghal 2005; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). However, many companies have neglected to 
provide adequate and meaningful RMD (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2008; Perignon and Smith, 2010). This was a significant contributor to both the cause and the 
severity of the global financial crisis (ASX CGC, 2013), prompting the United States (US) 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to warn companies about providing generic non-
company specific RMD (Johnson, 2010). In response there has been an international drive by 
academics, regulators and professionals for higher quality RMD (ASB, 2009; Dobler et al., 
2011; FASB, 2001a; ICAEW, 2011; Ismail and Rahman, 2011; Abraham and Shrives, 2014).  
 
Research on the quality of RMD is extremely important from a global perspective given the 
differing regulatory and institutional settings in various jurisdictions. This study is conducted 
in Australia where a unique environment exists in which to examine narrative RMD as they 
are neither mandatory, nor purely voluntary. The Australian RMD regulatory framework is 
principle-based and self-regulatory, where an ‘if not, why not’ approach has been adopted 
since 2003. Principle 7 ‘Recognise and Manage Risk’ of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations (CGPR) Second Edition (ASX CGC, 2010), provides the 
primary guidance for RMD at the time of this study. Principle 7 recommends that companies 
need to consider disclosing all material business risks and if they do not an explanation 
should be provided.  
 
To date research providing empirical evidence on the quality of RMD in Australia has been 
sparse. Carlon et al. (2003) examine voluntary disclosures in the 1998 annual reports of ASX 
listed mining companies and find considerable variation in the content and level of RMD.  
Taylor et al. (2010) examine mandatory and discretionary RMD for extractive firms during 
the period 2002-2006; three years pre and one year post the adoption of IFRS.  Their findings 
reveal a significant increase in both mandatory and discretionary RMD following the 
adoption of IFRS. Zhang et al. (2013) examine voluntary RMD in the 2009 annual reports of 
66 middle sized non-financial companies. Results reveal that RMD portrayed companies and 
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managers in a positive light. More recently Buckby et al. (2015) discover divergent RMD 
practices, which are unlikely to depict underlying corporate risks, when examining the top 
300 ASX listed companies in 2010. These previous Australian studies focus predominantly 
on the total quantity of RMD overlooking the examination of ‘richness’. 
 
The objective of this study is to utilise a finer-grained approach to examine the ‘quality’ - 
‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ (width and depth) of RMD for the top 100 ASX listed companies, 
by adopting the multidimensional disclosure framework proposed and tested by Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2008). They argue that although assessing disclosure quality is inherently 
complex, merely adopting quantity measures alone are not a good proxy for disclosure 
quality. The utilisation of this framework enables the ‘capture’ of quality dimensions not 
achievable by adopting a simplistic approach. The top 100 ASX listed companies for the 
2012 financial year will be precisely ‘matched’ to the same companies for the 2010 financial 
year. These years were specifically selected as representing a time frame where there have 
been no institutional changes to RMD regulations, i.e. following the adoption of the second 
edition of the ASX CGPR (ASX CGC, 2010), but before the release of the consultation draft 
on the third edition of the ASX CGPR (ASX CGC, 2013). It is within this time frame that the 
ASX CGC has determined that the ‘if not, why not’ approach may not be working effectively. 
Therefore it is important to provide empirical evidence on the quality of RMD and whether 
RMD were updated during this time in accordance with the intent of ASX CGPR (ASX CGC, 
2010), or whether company compliance with the ‘if not why not’ regime is deficient. To 
acquire further insights statistical analysis was performed to determine the relationships 
between total RMD and various sub-dimensions of RMD quality and the determinants 
driving that quality. In order to achieve this objective two research questions have been 
developed. 
 
RQ1. What is the ‘quality’ - ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ of RMD for the top 100 ASX 
listed companies? 
 
RQ2. What are the determinants driving ‘quality’ - ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ of 
RMD for the top 100 ASX listed companies? 
 
Results for RQ1 reveal a low level of RMD quality, in terms of ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’. In 
assessing not only how much is disclosed but what is disclosed and how; empirical evidence 
indicates low compliance with the ‘if not, why not’ regime for the top 100 ASX listed 
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companies. First, a large proportion of disclosures for both years contained ‘information not 
relevant to RM’. This confirms that merely counting the number of sentences or words does 
not adequately measure the amount of useful information. Additionally, many companies 
produced ‘boiler plate’ RMD for 2010 and 2012. These RMD were subsequently examined 
for the 2011 year and found to be identical/close to identical to the years previously 
examined. Thus, the RMD for these companies were ‘boiler plate’ in three consecutive 
annual reports. Second, a large number of ‘information relevant to RM’ disclosures for both 
years, could only be classified as ‘general risk’, rather than within the ‘13 specific risk 
categories’ as recommended in the ASX CGPR (ASX CGC 2010). This indicates that many 
disclosures are vague and are not providing users with meaningful ‘company specific’ risk 
information. Third, companies provided a low level of ‘forward-looking’, ‘financial’ and 
‘negative’ RMD, with an almost non-existent number of ‘monetary’ and ‘positive’ RMD in 
both years. These results strongly indicate that the ‘richness’ attributes of ‘width’ and ‘depth’ 
most useful to users, are severely lacking in RMD for the top 100 ASX listed companies in 
Australia. They also reaffirm the assertion that analysing quantity (total RMD) alone is not a 
good proxy for quality. 
 
In answering RQ2, results of the OLS regression analysis for the pooled data (2010 and 2012) 
reveal numerous significant associations between company determinants and the ‘quantity’ 
and ‘richness’ (width and depth) sub-dimensions of the RMD framework. Firm size is 
positively associated with total RMD and the seven sub-dimensions of the framework that 
arguably produce a higher quality of RMD. Cross listing is also positively associated with 
total RMD and the seven sub-dimensions. Leverage is negatively associated with two sub-
dimensions, while firm risk is positively associated with two sub-dimensions. The results for 
RQ1 and RQ2 clearly demonstrate that by conducting a ‘finer-grained’ analysis of the quality 
of RMD and exploring the determinants driving quality, a more comprehensive 
understanding of RMD quality is depicted compared to more simplistic approaches. 
 
In responding to the invitation by Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) to utilise their framework in 
other jurisdictions, the results of this study provide a ‘finer-grained’ and more detailed 
portrayal of RMD in Australia and adds to; and extends the global body of research in this 
area. Overall, the results provide valuable empirical evidence for practitioners, researchers 
and particularly regulators, who at present oversee a rather piecemeal approach to RMD 
regulation from a global perspective. Perhaps a more concerted effort on the future direction 
5 
 
of RMD aiming towards an international mandatory approach would assist in the 
advancement of RMD quality. This research may also be useful to the capital markets, as 
high quality RMD can significantly improve market liquidity through a reduction in 
information asymmetry thus increasing the flow of capital into the markets (Campbell et al., 
2014; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). The Australian equities market is the fifth largest in the 
world with a total market capitalisation of AU$ 1.28 trillion in 2012 (ASX Limited 2012), 
with foreign investors owning at least 40% (Black and Kirkwood, 2010). Consequently the 
quality of RMD for Australian listed companies’ is important both domestically and 
internationally, and is integral to the availability, accessibility and security of funds in the 
capital markets. 
 
Literature review  
International mandatory and voluntary studies 
Although there is a consensus on the need for informative narrative RMD, opinions differ as 
to whether these should be mandatory or voluntary (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004) and as yet the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has not issued a mandatory risk reporting 
standard (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). A dilemma facing regulators is that 
if the requirements are too prescriptive RMD may become ‘uniform’ providing minimal 
useful company specific information to investors. Conversely, where RMD are ‘optional’ 
companies may provide little or no risk management information. The underlying motives 
influencing how much companies disclose and the usefulness of disclosures also vary 
depending on whether the RMD are mandatory or voluntary (Miihkinen, 2012; Elshandidy 
and Neri, 2015). 
 
Studies have been conducted in various countries that have adopted International Financial 
Reporting Standards where, under IFRS7 ‘Financial Instruments: Disclosures’, mandatory 
RMD are required in the Notes to the Accounts for financial instruments [1].  For example, 
Lajili and Zéghal (2005) in Canada, Hassan (2009) in the United Arab Emirates, 
Taylor et al. (2010) in Australia, Elshandidy et al. (2013) in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Domínguez and Gámez (2014) in Spain.  
 
At the domestic level mandatory narrative RMD may be imposed under listing rules and 
other country specific regulations. The SEC in the US and Canada requires companies to 
provide financial risk information pertaining to operations, financial condition, liquidity and 
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forward-looking information in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section 
of annual reports filed on a 10K-form  (Clarkson et al., 1999; Lajili and Zéghal 2005; Amran 
et al., 2009).  Recent research suggests these RMD appear to be firm specific and are more 
useful to investors’ in assessing risk (Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014).  
Studies have examined RMD following the implementation of the German Accounting 
Standards Board’s GAS 5 ‘Risk Reporting’. Results reveal an increase in RMD over time, but 
they are predominantly qualitative (compared to quantitative), historical, non-time specific 
and concentrate on general risk factors (Vielmeyer, 2004; Kajüter, 2004). The Finnish 
Accounting Practice Board published a risk disclosure standard in 2006, which specifies 
reporting requirements. The overall quality of RMD improved post-standard with more 
qualitative information, but only a marginal increase in quantitative information (Miihkinen 
2012). The improvements under mandatory regimes can be explained by litigation theory, 
where the threat of litigation from regulatory authorities for inadequate disclosures (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001), can provide the motivation for improving RMD quality. 
 
Voluntary narrative RMD are also encouraged in various jurisdictions, within domestic 
regulatory frameworks (CICA, 2001; FASB, 2001b; ICAEW, 2002). All promote the 
disclosure of financial and non-financial information, strategies and actions to mitigate risk, 
forward-looking information and other information to clarify the risk profile of the company. 
Studies examining voluntary disclosures in the UK have found non-monetary RMD are much 
more prevalent than monetary, are generally lacking in coherence and are non-specific 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2005; 2006). The findings in a later longitudinal study were similar, 
where RMD were very general rather than specific, qualitative rather than quantitative, non-
company specific, were often ‘boilerplate’ and of limited use to investors (Abraham and 
Shrives, 2014). They attribute this finding to the threat of proprietary costs restricting 
managements’ willingness to disclose higher quality RMD. Proprietary cost theory does 
suggest that companies may produce RMD that are unhelpful to users, as managers will trade 
off the benefits of increased disclosure against the potential costs of disclosing (Abraham and 
Shrives, 2014). Therefore, companies may have an incentive not to disclose ‘firm specific’ 
information as this may reduce their competitive advantage (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Cotter 
et al., 2011). 
 
Several multi-country comparative studies have also been conducted. Elshandidy and Neri 
(2015) found higher levels of voluntary disclosures than mandatory for UK companies, while 
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Italian companies provided more mandatory RMD than voluntary. Dobler et al. (2011) 
compared RMD in all sections of the annual reports (mandatory and voluntary) for 
companies in the US, Canada, the UK and Germany.  They found a prevalence of qualitative 
(compared to quantitative), historic, present and non-time specific (compared to forward-
looking) RMD.  They suggest this may be due to management withholding quantitative and 
forward-looking information in order to avoid the negative consequences of disclosure. 
Litigation theory suggests that the threat of stakeholder litigation can provide a disincentive 
for voluntary disclosures (Healy and Palepu, 2001), particularly when the information is 
subjective or based on estimates. 
 
Common approaches to RMD research 
Content analysis is commonly used to examine RMD and at a basic level is based on 
counting the total number of sentences or total number of specific words. Studies using this 
approach find that RMD in many countries lack specificity and depth, showing a low level of 
forward-looking and quantitative information (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; 2006; Lajili and 
Zéghal, 2005; Linsley et al., 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Dobler et 
al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2011; Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013; Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014). 
 
A disclosure index, can be, self-constructed, an adopted index or a readability index (see 
Hassan, 2009; Taylor et al., 2010; Hemrit and Arab, 2011; Domínguez and Gámez, 2014). 
All attempt to measure the level and indicate the quality of RMD by developing a numerical 
indicator. Studies using this approach have found RMD to be of a low level of quality 
(Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili and Zéghal, 2005).  
 
Textual analysis and semantic properties of RMD  
Researchers have questioned whether either content analysis or a disclosure index approach, 
can assess RMD quality adequately, as they both appear to be a poor proxy for disclosure 
quality (Beattie et al., 2004b; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004, 2008; Linsley and Shrives, 2005). 
More recent studies have attempted to reduce these deficiencies by employing textual 
analysis to examine RMD. Kravet and Muslu (2013) analysed the MD&A section of 10-K 
filings by counting a ‘risk disclosure’ as such, if a sentence contains at least one risk related 
keyword. Their findings reveal that annual changes in RMD are significantly and positively 
related to an increase in stock return volatility and trading volume and therefore provide 
useful information to investors. Campbell et al. (2014) identified 300 keywords which were 
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then sub-categorised. They found that where the companies’ risk factors are higher there is an 
increased number of RMD and that the type of risk determines the number of RMD, 
providing evidence that RMD are useful to investors. 
 
Consistent with prior research, this study will adopt a manual content analysis approach 
which will include examining the semantic properties of RMD (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004, 
2008; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Miihkinen 2012). This analysis will focus on how much 
is disclosed (the quantity of disclosures), what is disclosed and how, that is the richness of the 
content of disclosures (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). The semantic properties of information 
serve as useful proxies for the quality of RMD and “allow external users to look at firms 
through the eyes of management” (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007, p. 806).  
 
RMD Framework  
Three dimensions and seven sub-dimensions of the disclosure framework proposed by 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) will be adopted and applied to the Australian regulatory context 
to examine the quality of RMD. The dimensions and sub-dimensions consist of: (i) quantity 
(‘information relevant to RM’ and ‘information not relevant to RM’), (ii) width (‘13 ASX 
CGPR risk categories’ and ‘general risk’) and (iii) depth (‘time orientation’, ‘types of 
measure’ and ‘economic sign’).  Time orientation comprises of ‘historical’, ‘forward-looking’ 
and ‘non-time specific’ information. Types of measure comprises of ‘financial’, ‘non-
financial’, ‘monetary’ and ‘non-monetary’ information.  Economic sign consists of ‘positive’, 
‘negative’ and ‘no-direction’ information.  Other studies have focused on only a select 
number of these variables for example, Linsley and Shrives (2005) examined forward-
looking and quantified RMD. Miihkinen (2012) examined the semantic properties of 
quantity, coverage, qualitative, quantitative and outlook profile of RMD and calculated a 
composite score of RMD quality. In extending prior research this study will individually 
examine all the dimensions and sub-dimensions of the framework depicted in Figure 1. This 
will provide a finer-grained approach to investigating the ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ of RMD 
quality. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
This framework, originally proposed in an earlier paper by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), was 
criticised by Botosan (2004, p. 290) who contends that a quality framework “ultimately relies 
on counting the number of disclosure items and that ultimately quantity and quality are 
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positively related”. This may be valid to some extent however; the advantage of analysing the 
sematic properties of content is that it provides more precise, detailed information, which is 
then aggregated in some meaningful way into numeric values for further analysis (Li, 2010). 
In their later paper Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) validated their multidimensional framework 
by testing the quantity and richness of forward-looking disclosures in the Italian stock market 
and found that the model was useful to financial analysts in forecasting earnings and in 
supporting investors’ economic decisions. Miihkinen (2012) also recognised the importance 
of adopting various elements of the framework. Thus, the authors contend that the adoption 
of this framework will provide a richer profile of corporate RMD in Australia than previous 
studies. Arguably some sub-dimensions provide more useful information to users than others 
and therefore could be considered as providing a higher quality of RMD. 
 
Quantity - (‘Information relevant/not relevant to RM’) 
Although total quantity is not a valid proxy for RMD quality in its entirety (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2008; Beattie et al., 2004b), the total quantity can indicate the effort that 
companies employ in providing comprehensive RMD (Shrives and Brennan, 2015) and has 
been shown to have a significant positive correlation with RMD quality (Miihkinen, 2012). 
Importantly, in this study, total quantity is assessed as representing quality based on whether 
the RMD includes ‘information relevant to RM’. That is, RMD are perceived to be 
meaningful only when they provide financial report users with relevant risk information for 
decision making. Conversely ‘information not relevant to RM’ is perceived to be not 
meaningful and does not provide users with relevant risk information. This distinction is 
extremely important as users require RMD that are useful in forming their own individual 
risk assessments (ICAEW, 2011). The distinction is also consistent with prior studies (Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004, 2008; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). Therefore only sentences useful 
to external users are recognised as providing RM information (Cheung et al., 2010) and are 
further coded according to the framework as they represent a higher quality of RMD. 
 
Richness: Width - (‘13 ASX CGPR risk categories’ and ‘General risk’) 
Width relates to the variety of topics and sub-topics revealed when examining all types of 
disclosures (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). In this study width relates to the specific 
categorisation of RMD as recommended by the ASX CGC (2010) [2]. Prior studies suggest 
disclosures that are more specific, are of a higher quality because the report users can identify 
particular company risks, which enable a more accurate assessment of a company’s risk 
10 
 
profile (Garcia-Meca and Martinez, 2005; Aerts et al., 2008; Oliveira et al., 2011). 
Conversely, general risk disclosures can only provide users with a ‘vague’ or an ‘overall’ 
view of a company’s risk and are inadequate for financial report users (Oliveira et al., 2011). 
It follows that RMD coded within the ‘13 ASX CGPR risk categories’ will provide a higher 
quality of RMD.  Disclosures too vague to be coded to any of the specific categories were 
coded to ‘general risk’.  
 
Richness: Depth  
Time Orientation - (‘historical’, ‘forward-looking’ and ‘non-time specific’) 
Forward-looking RMD are considered more useful to users than ‘historical’ or ‘non-time 
specific’ (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004, 2008; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Miihkinen, 
2012) and are required to be included in the MD&A section under US SEC listing rules 
(Linsmeier et al., 2002; Lajili and Zéghal, 2005). Forward looking RMD play an important 
role in efficient market reactions being positively associated with the accuracy of analysts’ 
future earnings forecasts (Barron et al., 1999; Dietrich et al., 2001; Linsley and Shrives, 
2000; 2005). Clarkson et al. (1999) also provide evidence that changes in forward-looking 
RMD vary directly with future company performance and can therefore positively affect the 
level of share price anticipation (Schleicher and Walker, 1999).  The value of forward-
looking RMD is in enabling investors to better assess the firms predicted future risks, 
economic performance and adjust their investment decisions accordingly (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Dobler, 2008).  Although predictive, provided forward-looking RMD are 
forecast accurately some of the risks should crystallise (Abraham and Shrives, (2014), 
thereby validating their usefulness to investors. However, managers are more likely to 
disclose historical rather than forward-looking RMD, because forward-looking RMD tend to 
be uncertain and could expose companies to potential claims or threats from users who rely 
on that information (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; 2006; Dobler, 2008; Oliveira et al., 2011).  
Historical and non-time specific RMD are considered unhelpful to investors and may not 
assist in providing an efficient and effective allocation of capital to the markets (Al-Najjar 
and Abed, 2014). Therefore, based on the above discussion and consistent with Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2008), ‘forward-looking’ RMD would indicate a higher quality of RMD. 
 
Types of measure - (‘financial’, ‘non-financial’, ‘monetary’ and ‘non-monetary’) 
In the context of this study ‘financial’ RMD refer to disclosures that contain financial terms, 
such as cash flow, ratios, profits, revenues, expenses, foreign currency exchange rates, 
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commodity price changes etc. In some instances these disclosures are then quantified into 
monetary terms, or remain as non-monetary terms. Previous studies advocate the usefulness 
of financial and monetary disclosures. For example, companies could quantify the risk size 
wherever possible to provide a monetary value in order to improve the quality of RMD and 
assist users to assess company risks (Linsley and Shrives, 2000; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
Under US SEC listing rules companies are required to quantify their RMD for interest rate 
risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk and commodity price risks in their MD&A section 
of 10-K filings (Linsmeier et al., 2002; Lajili and Zéghal, 2005). In reporting evidence on this 
Linsmeier et al. (2002) found that quantitative RMD reporting on adverse changes in interest 
rates, foreign currency exchange rates and commodity prices; provide investors with useful 
information by reducing uncertainty regarding changes in firm value. They found that 
following these disclosures there was a decline in trading volume sensitivity based on 
changes in these financial indicators. 
 
It follows that ‘financial’ and ‘monetary’ RMD would indicate a higher quality. However, 
difficulties exist in relation to companies providing this information (Schrand and Eilliott, 
1988; Linsley and Shrives, 2000; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004).  Managers are unlikely to 
quantify the monetary size of their risks, as this can be highly judgemental and difficult 
(Kadous et al., 2005). They also have incentives not to disclose quantitative or financial RM 
information, as they may be subsequently required to justify their prior estimates (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2005; Dobler, 2008; Oliveira et al., 2011), which may leave them vulnerable to 
litigation.  
 
Economic sign - (‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘no-direction’) 
The economic sign clarifies the expected impact of firm specific risks (Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2007). In order to have a credible capital market, companies should present both 
positive and negative RMD which is assessed as being more useful to users than no-direction 
information (Zhang et al., 2013). However, previous studies have indicated companies may 
prefer to present positive or negative rather than both. Skinner (1994) and Cotter et al. (2011) 
found that managers disclose negative information in order to avoid stakeholder litigation, 
reputation costs for failure to disclose and to maintain the firms’ equity value. Alternatively, 
managers may choose to disclose more positive information, to signal ‘good news’ to the 
market (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Zhang et al., 2013), their effectiveness in identifying, 
measuring and managing risk (Elshandidy et al., 2013) and to reduce the possibility of stock 
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undervaluation (Weisbach, 1988; Marsden et al., 2011). Therefore, both ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ disclosures would indicate a higher quality of RMD than ‘no-direction’.   
 
Hypotheses development 
This study will examine the impact of firm leverage, risk, size, and cross listing status on the 
total quantity of RMD, which is consistent with many previous disclosure studies (Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Hassan, 2009; Taylor et al., 2010; Oliviera et al., 2011; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2014), and the individual sub-dimensions of RMD 
quality (RQ2).  
 
Leverage 
In many studies leverage has been identified as a factor that may influence the level of 
disclosures. Agency theory suggests that agency costs are higher for companies that have 
higher leverage, as increased debt levels allow potential wealth transfers from debtholders to 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In order to reduce agency costs, highly leveraged 
firms may increase their RMD quality to satisfy their shareholders and to illustrate the 
companies’ ability to manage high leverage risk. By providing a higher quality of RMD 
companies can also signal to the capital market their success in managing risks in order to 
make their securities more attractive.  Stakeholder theory suggests that shareholders in 
companies with high levels of debt require more informative disclosures in order to assess the 
risk level and how the company proposes to manage that risk. Alternatively, highly leveraged 
firms may be reluctant to disclose high quality RMD as high leverage increases the potential 
for bankruptcy risk and divulging too much information increases the company’s 
vulnerability (Miihkinen, 2012). According to proprietary cost theory, highly leveraged 
companies may be reluctant to reveal their proprietary information to competitors, as it may 
damage their competitive position (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Miihkinen, 2012). 
 
Many previous studies report an insignificant or negative relationship between leverage and 
RMD quantity (e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2006; Abraham and Cox, 
2007; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Miihkinen, 2012). However, other studies have found a 
positive relationship between RMD quantity and leverage (Amran et al., 2009; Hassan, 2009; 
Taylor et al., 2010; Dobler et al., 2011; Elshandidy et al., 2015). Although there are two 
opposing positions, agency and stakeholder theory suggest, that as debt increases 
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shareholders and debtholders are in a bargaining position and therefore companies are more 
likely to provide a higher quality of RMD (Ahn and Lee, 2004). Therefore, a positive 
directional hypothesis is proposed:  
 
H1.  There is a positive association between leverage and RMD quality 
 
Firm Risk  
Systematic risk (beta) is a market based measure of risk which has been widely used in 
accounting research (Bowman, 1979; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). A higher beta risk may lead 
to an increase in material risks associated with company operations and share price instability 
(Tao and Hutchinson, 2013). According to stakeholder theory companies are more likely to 
provide a greater quantity of RMD in order to explain why they have such high risks, and to 
provide investors with a better understanding of how they propose to manage those risks 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Dobler et al., 2011). However, some companies may not want to 
draw attention to the fact they have a high level of firm risk and in order to avoid costs they 
may be reluctant to disclose high quality RMD (Dobler et al., 2011). Proprietary cost theory 
suggests that companies may be reluctant to divulge firm specific information, particularly if 
it is negative, as it may reduce their competitiveness. Companies with low risk may want to 
highlight this achievement and therefore they may communicate a higher quality of RMD, 
signalling to the market their superior management skills in order to attract increased 
investment (Linsley and Shrives, 2006).  
 
In general, the higher the firm risk the more likely shareholders are to demand higher quality 
RMD, which companies need to provide to satisfy their shareholders’. Both Dobler et al. 
(2011) and Miihkinen (2012) found that firms with high beta provide a higher total quantity 
of RMD, for Canadian and Finnish companies respectively. Therefore, a positive directional 
hypothesis is proposed:  
 
H2.  There is a positive association between firm risk and RMD quality. 
 
Firm size 
Based on agency and stakeholder theory, large firms need to disclose more information to a 
diverse range of stakeholders in order to decrease agency costs and lower the information 
asymmetry between mangers and shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Therefore, 
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high quality RMD are necessary for large firms in order to satisfy the needs of a larger group 
of stakeholders (Amran et al., 2009).  In addition larger companies have an incentive to 
improve investors’ confidence and reduce political sensitivities by providing higher quality 
RMD (Hassan, 2009). Larger companies also have the expertise and resources to cover the 
cost of producing high quality RMD (Miihkinen, 2012) and are therefore more likely to 
provide a higher quality of RMD. 
 
Consistent with the above, studies reveal a positive association between firm size and total 
RMD quantity (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; 2006; Amran et al., 
2009; Hemrit and Arab, 2011; Dobler et al., 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy 
et al., 2013).  Importantly, Miihkinen (2012) found that firm size is significantly associated 
with RMD quantity, coverage, qualitative, quantitative, and outlook profile information. 
Therefore, a positive directional hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H3.  There is a positive association between firm size and RMD quality. 
 
Cross listing  
Cross listed companies face greater regulation being subject to the listing rules of each 
jurisdiction they operate within. As a result, they may be exposed to a wider range and 
increased complexity of risks, including the potential of litigation for non-compliance. These 
companies are likely to have adopted more sophisticated RM policies and disclose a higher 
quality of RMD (Taylor et al., 2010). Additionally, cross listed companies have incentives to 
provide high quality RMD in order to signal ‘good news’ to the capital markets regarding 
their risks, risk management activities and the sustainability of their operations; which 
improves their access to financial resources (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). The relationship 
between cross listed companies and their diverse stakeholders is likely to be more complex, 
with companies endeavouring to satisfy all their stakeholders’ needs by balancing their 
competing demands (Roberts, 1992; Gray et al., 1996) thus driving the provision of higher 
quality RMD. 
 
Prior research reveals that companies that are cross listed significantly increase the total 
quantity (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009; Miihkinen, 2012), 
coverage, qualitative, quantitative and outlook profile of RMD (Miihkinen, 2012). It follows, 
that Australian companies who are also listed in other advanced countries such as the US are 
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more likely to provide a higher quality of RMD as their requirements are more rigid than they 
are under the ‘if not, why not’ regime.  For example, since 2005 the SEC has mandated that 
companies identify, discuss and analyse risk factors in relation to cash flows and their 
operations in Section 1A of their annual report on a 10-K form. The SEC reviews these 
disclosures and where companies have not provided adequate risk information they have been 
required to provide more (Johnson, 2010), thus providing a strong incentive for higher quality 
RMD. Therefore, a positive directional hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4. There is a positive association between cross listing and RMD quality. 
 
Research design 
Sample selection 
The sample comprises the top 100 ASX listed companies ‘matched’ for the years 2012 and 
2010, i.e. 100 ‘matched pairs’. The initial sample, selected in 2012, comprises the top 100 
ASX listed companies measured by market capitalisation.  These 100 companies were then 
precisely matched to the same companies in 2010. However, nine companies were removed 
from the initial 2012 sample as they could not be matched to the 2010 year. These were 
replaced with the next nine companies listed on the ASX by market capitalisation in 2012 
that could be specifically matched to the same companies in 2010, thus bringing the total up 
to ‘100 matched pairs’. The sample profile by industry sector code is presented in Table 1. 
 
The top 100 companies were chosen as larger firms would be more advanced in their attempt 
to provide RMD than smaller firms (Linsley and Shrives, 2005). The year 2012 was chosen 
as it is prior to the release of the 3rd edition of the “ASX CGPR consultation draft” in 2013 
(ASX CGC, 2013). The comparative year 2010 was chosen as companies would have had 
sufficient time to comply with the second edition of the ASX CGPR issued in 2007 (ASX 
CGC, 2007).  In addition the effect of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis should have 
diminished, as evidence shows there was a low level of RMD during these years in Australia 
(Probohudono et al., 2013). Thus, these two years are representative of a time frame where 
there have been no regulatory RMD changes in Australia. Previous studies have shown an 
improvement in RMD following regulatory changes (Miihkinen, 2012; Kravet and Muslu, 
2013). One of the aims of this study is to investigate whether RMD change during a time of 
no regulatory changes, or whether companies simply adopt a ‘boiler plate’ approach to RMD. 
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[Insert Table 1 here]  
Data analysis method 
In order to answer RQ1 semantic content analysis was performed on the RMD included in the 
corporate governance statement of company annual reports [3]. The sentence as the text unit 
was adopted which is consistent with many previous studies (Lajili and Zéghal, 2005; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2005; 2006; Linsley et al., 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Dobler, et al., 2011; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Abraham and Shrives, 2014). Content analysis is inevitably 
subjective (Milne and Adler, 1999; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Li, 2010), therefore two 
approaches to minimise subjectivity were adopted (Milne and Adler, 1999).  First, the data 
was coded using QSR Nvivo with one coder performing the initial data coding, which was 
then repeated by a second coder. Any coding differences between the two were discussed and 
the data re-analysed in order to reach a consensus decision. Second, the data evaluation and 
coding process followed a well-defined set of categories and specific decision rules 
developed by Linsley and Shrives (2006) [4]. Although these were developed and tested 
during content analysis of narrative RMD for firms listed on the FT-SE 100, they are generic, 
non-country specific and therefore are easily adopted in the Australian context. 
 
The coding process then followed the quantity, width and depth dimensions of the RMD 
framework.  Initially all sentences were coded within the quantity dimension as ‘information 
relevant to RM’ or ‘information not relevant to RM’.  Consistent with prior research the 
sentences coded as not relevant were not analysed further (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007). Wilcoxon signed rank tests were conducted to compare the 
differences between the years and between the sub-dimensions. This test does not need to 
satisfy the normality assumption and has been used in other risk disclosures studies (Tufano, 
1996; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
 
In order to answer RQ2 (OLS) regressions were utilised to test the relationship between the 
determinants, total RMD and individual sub-dimensions of RMD quality. The financial data 
was collected from SIRCA and the Morningstar database, while the non-financial data was 
hand collected from the companies’ annual reports and the ASX website.  
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Research model  
As hypothesised a number of factors may influence RMD quality and the following 
regression model is utilized to test the association between potential determinants, total RMD 
and sub-dimensions of the framework. 
 
Yi,t= a + b1LEVi,t+ b2BETAi,t+ b3lnMKTCAPi,t + b4CSLTi,t + b5ROAi,t + b6PTBi,t + b7SCONi,t + 
b8INDUSi + b8YEARi  + ɛi,t 
 
Table 2 presents a more detailed description of all variable definitions. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables represent  sub-dimensions of the framework that arguably produce a 
higher quality of RMD; ‘total RMD’, ‘information relevant to RM’, ‘13 ASX risk categories’, 
‘forward-looking’, ‘financial’, ‘monetary’, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’.  
 
Independent variables and control variables  
The independent variables of: leverage, firm risk, firm size and cross listing were utilised to 
test the four hypotheses. Consistent with prior literature, profitability (ROA), growth 
opportunity (PTB), shareholder concentration (SCON) and industry (INDUS) were selected as 
control variables (Miihkinen, 2012).  
 
Profitability (ROA):  
Profitability may impact on the level of RMD. Based on agency theory, managers reporting 
high company profits, tend to produce more RMD to provide sufficient evidence and explain 
their performance to shareholders (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). Agency theory also 
suggests that by providing more effective disclosures, managers may increase investors’ 
confidence, which in turn, increases their compensation (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). 
Companies that report high profits are also more likely to signal their superior performance to 
the market by providing a higher quality of disclosures (Wallace et al., 1994; Cotter et al., 
2011). Therefore, positive relationships between profitability and RMD quality sub-
dimensions are expected.  
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Growth opportunity (PTB):  
Growth opportunity may impact RMD as investors tend to have high expectations of firms 
with high growth opportunity. Thus, growth firms are more likely to issue higher quality risk 
disclosures in order to satisfy these expectations (Miihkinen, 2012). Growth companies may 
also produce high quality RMD to mitigate information asymmetry problems and higher 
agency costs (Smith and Watts, 1992; Eng and Mak, 2003). Therefore, positive relationships 
between growth opportunity and RMD quality sub-dimensions are expected.  
 
Shareholder concentration (SCON):  
Shareholder concentration may impact RMD levels as agency theory suggests ownership 
structure affects the level of monitoring, which in turn affects the level of disclosures (Eng 
and Mak, 2003).  Companies with a concentrated ownership structure may not be willing to 
provide high quality RMD, as their shareholders can obtain risk information privately 
(Miihkinen, 2012). Therefore, negative relationships between shareholder concentration and 
RMD quality sub-dimensions are expected.  
 
Industry (INDUS): 
Different industry sectors may provide quite different RMD due to industry specific 
characteristics. This particularly applies to the financial industry sector, which operates under 
a layer of increased regulation and scrutiny. Although it is acknowledged financial industry 
firms have additional mandatory requirements, which are not examined in this study, these 
companies may also produce higher quality RMD under the ‘if not, why not’ regime than 
companies in other sectors. As the financial industry sector comprises of 26% of the total 
sample, this study controls for industry effects by including the financial industry sector as a 
control variable (Amran et al., 2009) [5]. 
 
Results and discussion - RQ1  
What is the quality of RMD? 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the descriptive results for the RMD ‘quantity’, ‘width’ and ‘depth’ 
dimensions respectively. Table 6 presents the results of the wilcoxon signed ranks tests of 
differences between sub-dimensions of quantity and depth.  
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Quantity  
Table 3 shows that the number of RMD sentences totalled 4057 in 2012, (3775 in 2010). Of 
these 63% contained ‘information relevant to RM’, with 37% containing ‘information not 
relevant to RM’ in both years.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Examples follow: 
Information Relevant to RM 
“Changes in currency exchange rates may adversely affect ANZ’s result” (ANZ, 
2010, p74). 
 
“Atlas will establish and maintain risk and opportunity management by ensuring a 
consistent approach to capturing and evaluating risks and opportunities” (AGO, 
2010, p37). 
 
Information not Relevant to RM 
“The Australian Government and its agencies, including APRA, the RBA and other 
financial industry regulatory bodies including the Australian Securities and 
Investment Committee, have supervisory oversight of ANZ” (ANZ, 2012, p67). 
 
“The board receives updates from management in relation to Caltex’s approach to 
climate change” (CTX, 2010, p78). 
 
The results of the quantity dimension strongly indicate that merely counting the total number 
of RMD sentences does not adequately measure the amount of ‘useful’ information, as 
companies may disclose a large amount of ‘information not relevant to RM’. This result 
supports Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) who advocate that the quantity of RMD is not 
necessarily a good proxy for quality. 
 
A closer examination of the ‘information relevant to RM’ disclosures for both years was 
conducted for the paired companies. This revealed that 18 companies had exactly the same 
RMD in 2012 as they had in 2010. Additionally, 21 companies had the same number of RMD 
with only a few words changed. To establish whether the RMD for these 39 companies had 
changed for the 2011 year, they were then manually scrutinised line by line to search for 
differences between the three years.  This examination revealed that the 18 companies who 
had not changed their RMD for 2010 and 2012 had not changed their RMD for the 2011 year 
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either.  Of the 21 companies where there were very minor changes in the wording of their 
RMD between 2010 and 2012, two companies had a very slight change in both 2011 and 
2012; one company had exactly the same wording for 2010 and 2011 with a slight change 
occurring in 2012.  The remaining 18 companies had very slight changes between 2010 and 
2011, but were exactly the same between 2011 and 2012.  Examples follow: 
 
No change in RMD 
“Crown has established policies for the oversight and management of material 
business risks and has adopted a formal Risk Management Policy. Risk 
management is an integral part of the industry in which Crown operates” (CWN, 
2012, p38; 2011, p39; 2010, p38).  
 
Minor changes in RMD 
“Telstra has established a formal and robust approach for assessing, treating and 
monitoring risks related to the successful pursuit of its business” (TLS, 2010, p54). 
 
“Telstra continues to improve its approach for managing, monitoring and reporting 
risks related to the successful pursuit of its business objectives” (TLS, 2011, p59).  
 
“Recognising this, Telstra continues to improve its approach for managing, 
monitoring and reporting risks related to the successful pursuit of its business 
objectives” (TLS, 2012, p59). 
 
This result may be due to an unchanged risk profile for these companies over this period.  
However, a more plausible explanation is that companies develop ‘boiler plate’ RMD and 
these are not re-evaluated or up-dated on an annual basis, during a period of no regulatory 
changes. This is not the intent of the ASX CGPR (ASX CGC, 2010) and provides evidence of 
a reasonably low level of RMD quality. This result confirms the findings of Abraham and 
Shrives (2014, p.101) where RMD did not alter from year to year, indicating ‘disclosure 
inertia’ and the provision of information that was not particularly useful to users.  
 
Width  
Table 4 shows that 81% of RMD were classified into the ‘13 ASX CGC’ categories in 2012 
(78% for 2010), with 19% classified into ‘general risk’ in 2012 (22% in 2010). When the 
categories were examined separately, ‘general risk’ is by far the most dominant risk category 
in both years. The next highest category was financial reporting risk, followed by strategic 
risk, operational, sustainability and market related risk. Almost all companies disclosed 
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within ‘general risk’ (97 in 2012, 96 in 2010), with a substantially lower number, disclosing 
within the ‘13 ASX categories’ (67 in 2012, 68 in 2010). 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
These results are consistent with previous RMD studies, where strategic, financial, 
operational and market risk categories are the most dominant (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; 
Lajili and Zéghal, 2005; Dobler et al., 2011; Buckby et al., 2015). Importantly the results 
demonstrate that many companies prefer to provide an overall ‘general’ risk disclosure 
instead of conforming to principle 7 of the ASX CGPR, which would provide more useful 
information for financial report users. Similar results were found by Abraham and Shrives 
(2014) where a much higher proportion of RMD were of a ‘general’ nature rather than 
relating to ‘company specific’ factors. Therefore, it is concluded the level of quality RMD 
within the ‘width’ dimension is reasonably low. Wilcoxon signed rank tests indicate a 
significantly higher level of operational and strategic RMD in 2012 compared to 2010. 
 
Depth 
Table 5 presents the descriptive results for ‘depth’ sub-dimensions of: ‘time orientation’, 
‘types of measure’ and ‘economic sign’.   
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Time orientation  
Results reveal that companies provide a lower level of ‘forward-looking’ RMD, 28% for 
2012 (27% in 2010), compared to ‘historical’, 36% in 2012 (37% in 2010) and ‘non-time 
specific’, 35% in 2012 (36% in 2010). Importantly, the number of companies disclosing 
‘forward looking’ RMD totalled 14 in both years, while the number of companies disclosing 
‘historical’ totalled 96 in 2012 (95 in 2010) and ‘non-time specific’ 77 in 2012 (74 in 2010). 
This indicates that very few companies are prepared to release ‘forward-looking’ risk 
information, which would provide future risk predictions useful for decision making. The 
results of wilcoxon signed rank tests, presented in table 6, indicate there is a significantly 
lower number of ‘forward-looking’, compared to ‘non-time specific’ and ‘historical’ RMD 
for both years. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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These results are consistent with prior findings in other countries, (Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004; Beattie et al., 2004a; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Dobler et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2011), 
where forward-looking information was extremely scant, but contrary to Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) who unexpectedly found a higher level of forward-looking RMD. As forward-looking 
RM information is more useful to investors (Dietrich et al., 2001; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005), RMD quality could be considerably improved with the 
adoption of greater levels of ‘forward-looking’ RMD and particularly an increase in the 
number of companies disclosing ‘forward-looking’ information.  
 
Types of measure  
Results for 2012 reveal that 21% of RMD contained ‘financial’ information (22% in 2010) 
and 79% ‘non-financial’ information (78% in 2010). Additionally, 99% of RMD contained 
‘non-monetary’, while 1% contained ‘monetary’ information for both years. Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests indicate companies provide significantly less ‘financial’ than ‘non-financial’ RMD, 
and significantly less ‘monetary’ than ‘non-monetary’ RMD. These results are consistent 
with Lajili and Zéghal (2005) and Abraham and Shrives (2014) where little evidence was 
found of the quantification of risk impacts. 
 
Importantly, the number of companies who disclose ‘non-financial’ RMD is more than four 
times higher than the number of companies who disclose ‘financial’ RMD. Similarly, the 
results suggest that even fewer companies disclose ‘monetary’ RMD, with 5 companies in 
2012 and 7 in 2010.  
 
Economic sign  
Results for 2012 reveal that 82% of RMD indicate ‘no’ economic direction (81% in 2010), 
18% indicate a ‘negative’ economic direction (18% in 2010) and zero RMD indicate a 
‘positive’ economic direction (0.18% for 2010). There is also a significant difference in 
‘positive’ RMD between the years (0.046), although the actual number of RMD is minimal 
(zero in 2012, 5 in 2010). Wilcoxon signed rank tests confirm that companies provide 
significantly less ‘positive’ than ‘negative’ RMD and significantly less ‘negative’ than ‘no 
direction’ RMD. This result is consistent with Linsley and Shrives (2005). Again the number 
of company’s disclosing ‘positive’ RMD (zero in 2012, 4 in 2010), or ‘negative’ RMD (8 in 
both years) is poor. While the number of company’s disclosing ‘no direction’ RMD is high 
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(98 in 2012, 97 in 2010). The overall conclusion from the results of the depth dimension is 
that there is a low level of RMD quality. 
 
The overall results for RQ1, suggest the quality of RMD in Australia is fairly low. 
Approximately one third of disclosures do not provide useful information to stakeholders as 
they contained ‘information not relevant to RM’. Of the two thirds that contained 
‘information relevant to RM’, 39 companies did not change the wording of their RMD (or 
changed very little) for three consecutive financial years, 2010, 2011 and 2012.  This finding 
strongly suggests that those companies are simply using ‘boiler plate’ RMD, during a time 
frame when there have been no regulatory changes to impose improved disclosures. Within 
the ‘13 ASX risk categories’, ‘financial’ and ‘strategic’ risk dominates with disclosure levels 
around 12% - 14% for both years. However, the ‘general’ risk category is the most dominant 
category at approximately 20% for both years. This result may be explained by proprietary 
cost theory as some companies may prefer to disclose vague RM information rather than 
divulge company specific risk information, which may provide their competitors with 
sensitive information and reduce their competitiveness. Companies were also more reluctant 
to divulge ‘forward-looking’ and ‘financial’ RMD, while ‘monetary’ and ‘positive’ RMD 
were almost non-existent. The unwillingness of companies to provide, what arguably is a 
higher quality of RMD, may be explained by the threat of subsequent stakeholder litigation 
due to inaccurate predictions, overriding the appeal of improving the quality of RMD. 
However, overall the results suggest that the level of RMD quality is fairly low for this 
sample of companies with many not complying with the intent of the ASX CGPR (ASX 
CGC, 2010) under the ‘if not, why not’ regime. 
 
Results and discussion – RQ2 
What are the determinants driving RMD quality? 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 7 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables in the OLS regressions. These 
indicate that sample companies have a low level of, systematic risk (BETA) and leverage 
(LEV), with respective means of 1.13 and 0.45. Among the 100 ‘matched’ sample companies, 
26 are cross listed on other stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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OLS Regression results 
Table 8 provides the regression results for the pooled sample for 2010 and 2012. The 
following discussion highlights the significant results of the regressions used to test the 
hypothesised associations.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Leverage 
The results reveal that H1 is not supported. Leverage is not significantly associated with total 
RMD, which is consistent with prior studies (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007). However, leverage is negatively associated with ‘forward-looking’ 
and ‘positive’ RMD. This provides new evidence on the relationship between leverage and 
RMD quality sub-dimensions.  Firms with higher leverage are likely to provide less ‘forward- 
looking’ and ‘positive’ RMD than other firms. This can be explained by the argument that 
more highly leveraged companies are more reluctant to expose their vulnerability by 
communicating future risk predictions and any positive risk information to the market, as 
their risk of bankruptcy is higher than lower leveraged companies (Dobler et al., 2011; 
Miikinen, 2012). In addition, managers’ reluctance to divulge this proprietary information 
may be motivated by a desire to withhold company specific risk information from 
competitors (Cotter et al., 2011) and in particular mitigate any adverse consequences from 
subsequent litigation proceedings stemming from inaccurate future or positive predictions 
which do not eventuate. 
 
Firm risk 
The results partially support H2. Firm risk is positively associated with total RMD, which is 
consistent with the findings of Abraham and Cox (2007), Dobler et al. (2011) and Miihkinen 
(2012), who found a positive association between firm risk and total RMD in UK, Canadian  
and Finnish firms respectively.  Firm risk is also positively associated which ‘information 
relevant to RM’. This provides new evidence on the relationship between firm risk and RMD 
quality sub-dimensions.   Companies with higher firm risk are more likely to provide a higher 
level of RMD and importantly a higher level of RMD containing more useful information to 
users.  This result supports the stakeholder perspective, where firms are motived to better 
inform investors of the risks they face and how they propose to manage them when their firm 
risk is higher.  
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Firm size 
The results provide total support for H3. Firm size is positively associated with total RMD 
which is consistent with prior literature (Amran et al., 2009; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; 
2008; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Miihkinen, 2012; Oliveira et 
al., 2011; Buckby et al., 2015). Firm size is also positively associated with all seven sub-
dimensions of RMD quality; ‘information relevant to RM’, ‘13 ASX risk categories’, 
‘forward-looking’, ‘financial’ ‘monetary’, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ RMD. The majority of 
these results provide new evidence on the relationship between firm size and RMD quality 
sub-dimensions. This strongly suggests that larger firms are not only providing a higher 
number of RMD, but more importantly are considering the substance and usefulness of their 
disclosures to users in the market. This evidence also supplements Miihkinen (2012) who 
found that size has a significant positive association with qualitative and quantitative RMD 
and Linsley and Shrives (2006) who found that firm size was positively associated with 
financial RMD.  
 
The significance of size as a determinant of quality RMD supports the arguments proposed 
by agency and stakeholder theory.  Larger companies are more willing to disclose a higher 
quality of RMD to meet the information needs of lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which 
in turn decreases information asymmetry and reduces agency costs. Larger firms also have a 
greater number and more diverse group of stakeholders and therefore will endeavour to 
satisfy a vast range of information needs. 
 
Cross listing 
The results provide total support for H4. Cross listing is positively associated with total RMD 
which is consistent with Abraham and Cox (2007) and Rajab and Handley-Schachler (2009) 
who found that UK firms with a US stock exchange listing disclosed more risk information. 
Cross listing is also positively associated with all seven sub-dimensions of RMD quality;  
‘information relevant to RM’ , ‘13 ASX risk categories’, ‘forward-looking’, ‘financial’, 
‘monetary’, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ RMD. The majority of these results provide new 
evidence on the relationship between cross listing and RMD quality sub-dimensions. This 
evidence also supplements the findings of Miihkinen (2012) that dual listed companies on the 
Finnish and the NYSE were significantly associated with ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ 
RMD quality.  
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These results may be explained by the fact that reporting requirements differ in various 
jurisdictions and a higher quality of RMD comes at zero marginal cost when companies are 
cross listed (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Higher quality RMD can also signal to the market that 
these companies manage their risks effectively, which enhances their ability to raise funds in 
foreign markets (Taylor et al., 2010; Miihkinen, 2012). Cross listed companies are also 
reporting to a more diverse group of stakeholders and face more complicated regional risks.  
Additionally, a higher quality of RMD will also reduce the threat of litigation for non-
compliance with various regulatory requirements. Agency costs would be higher for firms 
with a more dispersed share ownership (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and by providing a higher 
quality of RMD information asymmetry problems can be reduced.   
 
Control variables  
Shareholder concentration is significantly negatively associated with the ‘13 ASX risk 
categories’, ‘forward-looking’, ‘financial’ and ‘negative’ RMD.  This provides new evidence 
and indicates companies with a more concentrated ownership structure provide a lower 
quality of RMD. These results extend the findings of Abraham and Cox (2007) who found 
long term institutional ownership was negatively related to the total quantity of RMD and 
short term institutional ownership was positively related to the total quantity of RMD.  
Proprietary cost theory and agency theory could explain this result. Institutional investors 
with large stockholdings may consider it too costly for companies to divulge more sensitive, 
firm-specific (quality) information to competitor investors and they have the power to 
command that information privately (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Larger shareholders are also 
more dominant in monitoring and directing the firm (Birt et al., 2006), therefore agency costs 
are lower and consequently there may be less pressure to provide a higher quality of RMD. 
 
Financial firms provide a higher level of ‘total RMD’.  Financial firms also provide a lower 
level of RMD within the ‘13 ASX risk categories’ compared to non-financial firms, which 
may be explained by the fact financial firms do not have the ‘spread’ of risks that would be 
found in other industries such as, ‘operational’ and ‘environmental’ risks.  There were no 
significant differences between financial and non-financial firms among the other six quality 
sub-dimensions.  This result is interesting because although financial firms provide a higher 
quantity of RMD, they could also be expected to produce a higher quality of RMD (apart 
from the mandated requirements such as IFRS 7 which they must comply with), due to 
increased regulation and scrutiny of this industry sector. This result suggests that financial 
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firms are not willing to provide a higher quality of RMD than non-financial firms, when 
disclosing under the ‘if not, why not’ regime of the ASX CGPR (ASX CGC, 2010).   
 
Profitability and growth opportunity were mainly found not to be significantly associated 
with any of the RMD framework sub-dimensions. The one exception is a marginally positive 
association between growth opportunity and ‘monetary’ RMD. These results support the 
findings of Taylor et al. (2010) who found an insignificant association between profitability 
and total quantity of RMD. In contrast, Miihkinen (2012) found profitability is significantly 
associated with total quantity of RMD, coverage, quantitative and outlook profile, whereas 
growth opportunity is significantly associated to total quantity of RMD and coverage. Finally, 
the results show that in 2012 companies disclose a higher level of ‘13 ASX risk categories’ 
and ‘financial’ RMD, compared to 2010. 
 
Robustness tests 
In order to assess the validity of the OLS regressions a check for multicollinearity and 
autocorrelation was conducted. In order to test the non-existence of autocorrelation the 
Durbin-Watson statistic was utilised. The results are considered acceptable as they are all 
approximately equal to two (Field, 2000). The correlation coefficients between the 
regressions variables were viewed. The results suggest that multicollinearity does not pose a 
severe problem to the validity of the regressions as none of the correlation coefficients exceed 
the cut-off point 0.80 (Gujarati, 2003). Table 8 presents the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
results checking for multicollinearity.  All the VIF values are between one and three, 
suggesting multicollinearity should not be an issue for the regression models.  Further, this 
study adopted ridge regressions and condition indices to check for multicollinearity. The 
results suggest that ridge regressions produce the same results as OLS regressions and the 
condition indices are all less than 10, indicating that there is no multicollinearity issue in the 
regressions (Belsley, 1991). Therefore the OLS regressions utilised in this study are valid. 
 
In order to verify the results, separate regression analysis was conducted for 2010 and 2012. 
Consistent with the pooled sample results, size and cross listing are the main determinants of 
RMD quality dimensions in both years. This result further validates the pooled results for H3 
and H4.  In addition, the results suggest that in 2012, leverage is positively related to ‘13 
ASX categories’. For both years firm risk has no significant association with any of the RMD 
quality sub-dimensions, which is inconsistent with the pooled sample results. Firms with a 
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high level of shareholder concentration, disclose a significantly lower level of ‘forward-
looking’ RMD in 2012 and a significantly lower level of ‘financial’ RMD in 2010. 
Additionally in 2012, financial firms disclose highwe levels of ‘information relevant to RM’, 
and consistent with the pooled sample results, financial firms disclose a lower level of RMD 
within the ‘13 risk ASX categories’. 
 
Conclusion and limitations 
Conclusion 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) developed and tested a multidimensional framework which 
advocates that RMD quantity is not a valid proxy for RMD quality in its entirety however; 
the vast majority of RMD studies in various jurisdictions have predominantly used this proxy.  
Motivated by this and the fact that there has been a scarcity of studies conducted in Australia 
under the ‘if not, why not’ RMD regime this study adopted a multi-dimensional framework to 
examine the quality - ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ (width and depth) of RMD for the top 100 
ASX listed companies matched for the 2010 and 2012 years (RQ1). By applying semantic 
content analysis to all of the dimensions and sub-dimensions of the framework a finer-
grained and more detailed analysis of RMD quality is obtained. 
 
The results reveal a low level of RMD quality from the ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ perspective, 
indicating low compliance with the ‘if not, why not’ regime for the top 100 ASX listed 
companies. From the ‘quantity’ perspective, a large proportion of RMD (37%) did not 
provide ‘relevant RM information’ in both years. In addition, 39 companies produced ‘boiler 
plate’ RMD for 2010, 2011and 2012. Companies also have a propensity to provide ‘general’ 
risk disclosures which are vague, in preference to providing more company specific risk 
disclosures within the ‘13 ASX CGPR risk categories’ of Principle 7. From the richness 
perspective the results indicate a low level of ‘forward-looking’, ‘financial’, ‘quantitative’, 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ RMD for both years. This relates to the number of disclosures and 
more importantly to the number of companies who are not disclosing within the ‘richness’ 
sub-dimensions.  In summary the quality of RMD could be assessed as being fairly low, 
which indicates that the conformity level with the intent of the ASX CGPR is deficient and 
consequently the quality of RMD could be greatly improved.   
 
In order to explore the determinants driving the sub-dimensions of RMD ‘quantity’ and 
‘richness’ (RQ2), OLS regression analysis was employed on the pooled sample, which 
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produced some important empirical evidence which extends prior research and provides new 
evidence on these associations. (1) Leverage is significantly negatively associated with 
‘forward-looking’ and ‘positive’ RMD. (2) Firm risk is significantly positively associated 
with ‘total RM disclosures’ and ‘information relevant to RM’. (3) Company size is positively 
associated with ‘total RM disclosure’, ‘information relevant to RM’, ‘13 ASX risk 
categories’, ‘forward-looking’, ‘financial’, ‘monetary’, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ RMD. (4) 
Cross listing is also positively associated with ‘total RM disclosures’, ‘information relevant 
to RM’, ‘13 ASX risk categories’, ‘forward-looking’, ‘financial’, ‘monetary’, ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ RMD.  
 
In addition, shareholder concentration is significantly negatively associated with the ‘13 ASX 
risk categories’, ‘forward-looking’, ‘financial’, and ‘negative’ RMD. Financial firms provide 
a higher level of ‘total RMD’ and a lower level of ‘13 ASX risk categories’, compared to 
non-financial firms. 
  
Several implications are derived from these results for practitioners, regulators and 
researchers. Evidence is provided that RMD quality is fairly poor for the top 100 ASX listed 
companies in Australia for the years examined. This supports the view of the ASX CGC 
(2010) that the principle-based, self-regulatory environment for narrative RMD is not 
working effectively. A considerable number of companies are not complying with the ‘intent’ 
of the ‘if not, why not’ approach.  This adds weight to the argument for the IASB (and/or 
other regulatory authorities) to introduce mandated narrative RMD regulations. Prior research 
in other countries has shown that under mandatory regulatory regimes, RMD were found not 
to be ‘boilerplate’ (Kravel and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014) and of a higher quality 
(Miikinen, 2012), thus providing meaningful firm-specific information useful to investors.  In 
addition Campbell (2014) suggests that mandated RMD reduce information asymmetry, with 
investors incorporating the information into stock prices. From a global perspective it would 
benefit users greatly to know that RMD were compiled under comparable regulations in 
different jurisdictions. These results and recommendations were submitted to ASX CGC as 
part of the call for comments on the proposed third edition of the ASX CGPR (ASX CGC, 
2013). 
 
The benefits of adopting a multidimensional framework to analyse and test the dimensions 
and sub-dimensions of ‘quantity’ and ‘richness’ within the one study, with the same sample, 
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contribute significantly to the global literature on RMD.  The ‘quality’ of RMD have been 
examined using a ‘finer-grained’ approach to investigate at a deeper level, compared to 
counting total sentences, words or calculating an index. This provides a ‘richer’ portrayal of 
RMD quality and provides new empirical evidence as to why some companies are more 
likely to disclose higher quality RMD than others.  
 
Limitations 
The importance of evaluating RMD quality cannot be underestimated even though it is 
evident that it is difficult to assess because the concept is both abstract and subjective (Beattie 
et al., 2004a, 2004b; Botosan, 2004).  Although two coders independently coded the RMD 
the subjectivity in conducting semantic content analysis cannot be completely eliminated. 
The detailed coding into the specific dimensions and sub-dimensions of the RM framework 
may be subject to debate. However, this does not mean that semantic content analysis should 
not be attempted (Shrives and Brennan, 2015).The results do make an important contribution 
by expanding on the existing literature and providing new empirical evidence. Risk 
information is also available from sources other than the narratives of annual reports, such as 
tables and graphs, which were not examined in his study. Companies may also disclose RM 
information through web sites and social media. These limitations provide opportunities for 
future studies to include risk information from these alternative sources.  
 
Future research could also extend this study by examining RMD for the top 100 ASX listed 
companies following the implementation of third edition of the ASX CGPR (ASX CGC, 
2014) and assess if the quality of RMD has improved. In addition a multi country comparison 
could be conducted examining RMD quality between the ‘if not, why not’ regime and a more 
mandatory approach, such as in Germany or the US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Notes 
 
1. Other RMD are required under IFRS 4 ‘Insurance contracts’ and IFRS 9 ‘Financial 
Instruments’.   
 
2. The ‘13 ASX CGPR risk categories’ are: operational, environmental, sustainability, 
compliance, strategic, ethical conduct, reputational, technological, product service quality, 
human capital, financial reporting, market related and legal risk.  
 
3. A few companies indicated there was a continuation of these disclosures in other sections 
of the annual report. These were also included in the analysis. 
 
4. The coding decision rules are available from the authors on request.  
 
5. This study includes the financial industry sector as a control variable for two reasons. First, 
the financial sector is the most dominant sector in the sample. Second, the study excludes 
other specific sectors as insignificant results for these were found following testing.  
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Figure 1: Framework for exploring the quality of risk management disclosure  
(Adapted from the quality framework by Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008, p342). 
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Table 1: Sample profile (top 100 ASX-listed companies)  
Industry (GICS) sector No. of companies 
Financials 26 
Materials 19 
Industrials 14 
Consumer Discretionary 11 
Health Care 9 
Energy 8 
Utilities 5 
Consumer Staples 5 
Telecommunication Services 2 
Information Technology 1 
Total No. 100 
 
 
Table 2: Variable definitions  
Variables  
Dependent variables  Explanations  
Total RMD ln (total number of RMD sentences) 
Information relevant to RMD ln (total number of RMD sentences containing information relevant to 
RM) 
13 ASX risk categories  ln (total number of RMD sentences containing risk information within 
the 13 risk categories) 
Forward-looking RMD ln (total number of RMD sentences containing forward-looking 
information) 
Financial RMD ln (total number of RMD sentences containing financial information) 
Monetary RMD ln (total number of RMD sentences containing monetary information) 
Positive RMD ln (total number of RMD sentences containing positive information) 
Negative RMD ln (total number of RMD sentences containing negative information) 
Predictors  
Leverage (LEV) The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to 
total assets 
Firm risk (BETA) The beta of the firm, systematic risk  
Firm size (lnMKTCAP) The natural logarithm of market capitalization as at 30 June 
Cross listing (CSLT) Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is listed on ASX 
and another stock exchange, 0 otherwise 
Controls  
Profitability (ROA) Firm profitability, measured by return to asset ratio, ROA 
Growth opportunity (PTB) Price to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalization to 
total common equity. 
Shareholder concentration 
(SCON) 
Measured by the proportion of ordinary share capital owned by the 
top 20 shareholders 
Financial industry (INDUS) Coded based on the GICS (Global Industry Classification 
Standard), dummy variable taking a value of 1 when firm is in the 
financial industry,  0 otherwise 
Year Year dummy variable 
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